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HOMOPHOBIA AND THE "MATHEW SHEPARD EFFECT"
IN LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
KRIs FRANKLIN*
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be, and now is, overruled.1
I. INTRODUCTION
To say that Supreme CourtJustice Anthony Kennedy's majority
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas was unexpected would be a massive
understatement. Readers on the political left and right, both sup-
porters and opponents of the civil rights of sexual minorities were,
frankly, gobsmacked by the Court's decision and Kennedy's lan-
guage in explaining it.2 Progressive commentators, legal scholars,
advocates, even the lawyers for the case, were cautiously optimistic
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari. But few, if any, raised
the possibility that despite the promising pro-gay signs of Romer v.
Evans,3 the Court would so decisively overturn its decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick4 so soon, less than two decades after it was issued.
5
That the Court far exceeded even the most ambitious expectations
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author would like to
thank Maya L. Cooper and Jessica L. Weiss for their valuable research assistance. The
author would also like to extend many special thanks to Sarah E. Chinn, whose contri-
butions made this essay possible.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Homosexual Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2003 at Al (observing that "few people on either side of the case expected a
decision of such scope. . ."); Breakthrough, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at A28 (deeming
the Court's "remarkable and majestic decision" an "enormous breakthrough"); Chris
Bull,Justice Served, THE ADVocATE, Aug. 19, 2003, at 35 (observing that "Court watchers
were stunned by the sweep of the decision").
3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Andy Humm, Supreme Court Sodomy Ruling Next Week, GAY CITY NEWS,
June 20, 2003 (noting that "[w]hile virtually all observers expect the court to overturn
the Texas gay-only sodomy law, there is no way to predict on what grounds the court
will decide the case"); Ted Streuli, Supreme Court to Hear Homosexual Case, GALVESTON
COUNTY DALv NEWS , Mar. 26, 2003 (quoting law professor Laura Oren predicting "I
don't believe for a minute they're going to say that homosexual conduct is protected.
•.. That would be a big, big thing and I can't see that.").
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of pro-gay observers in so doing,6 fulfilling the deepest fears of our
opponents,7 was astounding.
It is hard to describe the burst of euphoria this decision pro-
duced. Like so many other lesbians and gay men in the United
States, I was overwhelmed by the decision and moved by Kennedy's
invocation of human rights and the innate dignity of consensual
adult relationships in the context of homosexuality. Kennedy's
opinion demonstrated not only generosity of spirit, but also a kind
of intellectual cosmopolitanism usually absent from sodomy law de-
cisions - citing lesbian and gay historians,8 European parliamentari-
ans, 9 and civil libertarians, 10 as well as the usual array of judicial
precedents.
But my interest went beyond the historical import and legal
significance of the decision. Several years ago, I decided to write a
piece about legal authority and its rhetorics, and I chose to center
my discussion on state sodomy law decisions. I considered discuss-
ing a number of cases that had recently been issued by state courts,
including those in Louisiana, Montana, Kentucky, and Virginia,"
but ultimately decided to analyze a case then percolating through
6. See David J. Garrow, Sodomy and the Supremes, THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 4, 2003, at
52 (speculating that Lawrence and Garner's likelihood of success in the Supreme Court
was "no small thing," but that "limited optimism [might] be in order"). See also, Allen
Pusey, New Day for Gay Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 21, 2003, at IA; Richard
Kim, Queer Cheer: US. Supreme Court Overturns Texas Anti-Sodomy Laws, 3 THE NATION,
July 21, 2003, at 5.
7. See, e.g., John A. Corso, Supreme Court's Sodomy Ruling Sets Dangerous Moral Prece-
dent, HOME NEWS TRIB., July 29, 2003, at A22 (finding "particularly objectionable" the
conclusion that the majority's morality should not define the bounds of legal behavior);
Doug Bandow, Assault on Morality?, THE CAPITOL EYE, July 23, 2003, at k230 (quotingJay
Sekulow of the American Center for Law and Justice arguing that in Lawrence the Court
had struck a "damaging blow for the traditional family"); see also, Robert Robb, Eroding
the Constitution, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 9, 2003, at lB (arguing that Supreme
Court's role is to defer to the actual words in the Constitution); Bruce Fein, Ill-Reasoned
Frolic, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A14.
8. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
9. Id. at 2483.
10. Id. at 2479 (citing the amicus brief filed in the case by the American Civil
Liberties Union).
11. State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501 (La., 2000) (upholding constitutionality of Loui-
siana sodomy law); Gryczan v. State, 283 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (striking down Montana
sodomy law based on privacy protections in state constitution); Commonwealth v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (overturning Kentucky sodomy law because it has no
rational basis under the Kentucky constitution, and is discriminatory); Santillo v. Com-
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the courts in Texas, Lawrence v. State.' 2 My goal was primarily to
devise a set of classifications of legal authorities, 13 examining how
they are deployed in legal decisions in order to understand how
they can shape, and are shaped by, judicial outcomes. Given this
topic, to some extent I could have addressed almost any element of
United States law. But my decision to focus on sodomy law was not
entirely random. After all, in so many cases in which the state and
federal constitutionality of laws forbidding the array of behaviors
gathered under the rubric "sodomy" 14 was under consideration, the
use of legal authority was decidedly eccentric.1 5 And due to the
intense and far-reaching ideological charge of sodomy cases, the
choices of authority called upon to support or overturn these laws
revealed a great deal about how authority itself functions within the
judiciary.
At the time that I was working on my article, there was very
little commentary on Lawrence, particularly outside Texas. 16 When
I selected the case as an example for my analysis, the Texas Court of
Appeals had just overturned the state's sodomy law,17 a decision
monwealth, 517 S.E.2d 733 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding Virginia sodomy law as not
impermissibly vague).
12. Kris Franklin, The Rhetorics of Legal Authority: Constructing Authoritativeness, The
"Ellen Effect," and the Example of Sodomy Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 49 (2001) (hereinafter,
Rhetorics of Legal Authority).
13. In the earlier work I discussed the appropriately multiple connotations of the
word "authority" in this context, signaling as it does not only an underlying source for a
legal position, but a weighty determiner of a legal conclusion. See id. at 50.
14. Which might be all same-sex sexual activity, or specific set of sexual behaviors
that generally include oral and/or anal sex, or simply, some codification forbidding
"unnatural behavior." For a more complete discussion of historically prohibited behav-
ior, see Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values, 97 YALE L.J. 1073,
1082-89 (1988); see also Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479-80 (disputing the claim in Bowers v.
Hardwick that same-sex sodomy provisions were soundly rooted historically, and offer-
ing a "more complex" description of the multiplicity of meanings in sodomy prohibi-
tions); but see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192-93; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
15. See discussion in Franklin, supra note 12, at 56.
16. But see Mary Flood, Appeals Court Upholds State Sodomy Ban, THE HOUSTON
CHRON., Mar. 16, 2001, at Al.
17. Lawrence v. State, 2000 VWrL729417 (Tex. App. 2000), opinion withdrawn and
superseded on reh k by Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (2001)(the text of the withdrawn
opinion remains unpublished, but may be viewed at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/sup
ct/background/02-102_ref.htm) (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
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that was later retracted and reversed en banc.18 Because they not
only took opposing positions, but also seemed to spring from en-
tirely diverging notions of the cultural significant of gay sexual con-
duct, the appellate court's opinions and dissents offered textbook
examples of ways in which courts have used legal authority to talk
about sodomy, which made the case perfect for my purposes.
But on the national front, the case was fairly obscure. The
strategy of gay rights activists since Bowers had been focused prima-
rily, and often quite successfully, on attacking anti-sodomy statutes
state-by-state (recently, the Georgia sodomy law, which had given
birth to Bowers in the 1980s, had been overturned by the state's
highest court, 19 garnering some publicity simply because of the situ-
ation's irony20), and since Lawrence explicitly addressed state consti-
tutional issues, few observers expected that the case would go any
further. Bowers was still comparatively recent, and it explicitly shut
out any federal remedy to same-sex anti-sodomy laws.21
The core of my article analyzed not just the different ways in
which each incarnation of the Texas Court of Appeals (the original
panel and the Court sitting en banc) supported their opinions, but
18. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc). When this hap-
pened, about halfway through my writing process, I panicked, fearing that my argu-
ments about the case (and in fact the case itself) would disappear. In fact they did not,
since the new majority's decision reinstating the sodomy law was in concord with my
larger point. And, more importantly, the Texas Court's reactionary decision opened
the door for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the final appeal and overturn not only the
Texas sodomy statute, but also all sodomy laws across the nation. The ironies of this are
dizzying since what many gay rights advocates saw as a significant blow to the anti-sod-
omy law movement became the catalyst for the overturning of the touchstone of
homophobicjurisprudence. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Addition-
ally, one might imagine that had the majority ofjudges on the Texas Court of Appeals
known the ultimate consequences of their actions, they might have let the original deci-
sion stand: now, not only was their sodomy law obviated, but so was the entire frame-
work of anti-same sex discrimination that undergirded their decision.
19. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga., 1998).
20. See, e.g., Georgia Supreme Court Overturns Anti-Sodomy Law, CNN.coM, Nov. 24,
1998 available at http://www.cnn.com/US/9811/23/sodomy.law.03/ (last visited Feb.
9, 2004); Lisa Keen, Georgia Repeals Sodomy Law, WASHINGTON BLADE, Dec. 4, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.sodomylaws.org/usa/georgia/ganews21.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2004).
21. This does not mean, of course, that advocates were not eager for further op-
portunities to push the boundaries of federal sodomy law jurisprudence. Many were.
But Bowers was the controlling authority and was not especially likely to create room for
federal remedies against state restrictions on sodomy.
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also what the authorities they selected - from a wide variety of pos-
sibilities - revealed about their ideological positions. 22 Ultimately, I
used my analysis of the different ways the two diverging opinions
deployed legal authority to conclude that legal authorities do not
simply document an argument; they also predigest and presuppose
the decisions they reach. 23 Moreover, through the rubric of the
differing authoritative bases for the varied opinions, I identified a
cultural shift in discourse around homosexuality - a movement
toward conceptualizing gay identity rather than homosexual con-
duct, and a consequent re-imagination of the meaning(s) of homo-
sexuality. In honor of the enormous publicity given to comedian
Ellen DeGeneres's declaration that "yep [she was] gay," 24 I dubbed
that phenomenon the "Ellen effect."
The stakes attached to the Texas case changed precipitously
when the lead attorneys in Lawrence petitioned for certiorari, ambi-
tiously asking the United States Supreme Court to reexamine its
decision in Bowers.25 Surprisingly enough, the Court agreed. 26
Given that Texas's Lawrence was decided on state constitutional
grounds, 27 the Supreme Court's decision to hear the case strongly
suggested that it was considering overturning the Texas sodomy
law. When the Court finally issued its majority opinion, concur-
rence, and two dissents, what was remarkable was not just the
wholesale rejection of anti-gay sodomy law, but the breadth and
depth of difference between, and within, the sides, and the rheto-
rics they deployed to reach their conclusions. And significantly for
my purposes, the themes I discussed in the original Texas state
cases reappear in the federal constitutional analysis, but on a much
22. See discussion in Franklin, supra note 12, at 71-92.
23. Franklin, supra note 12 at 102-3, (observing that "[clonscious or not, legal
writers invisibly construct interpretive frameworks through their choices in introduc-
tion and positioning of authorities.")
24. Bruce Handy, Roll Over Ward Cleaver, and Tell Ozzie Nelson the News, TIME, Apr.
14, 1997, at 78.
25. See Brief of Petitioners, at i, 29-32, Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002)
(No. 02-102).
26. Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S.1044 (2002).
27. Namely the Texas Constitution's Equal Rights Amendment, TEXAS CONST., Ar-
ticle I, §§ 3, 3a. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d at 350 n.2.
20041
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broader and more self-consciously significant scale, perhaps be-
cause the stakes are so much higher.28
The decision reveals other cultural movements, on the left and
the right, (in its use of authority), and suggests others that may still
come. It seems that the roots of the change in the popular concep-
tion of gay people, for which I've reductively credited Ellen
Degeneres, have really taken hold. As a result, in many ways Jus-
tices Kennedy and Scalia are ultimately speaking the same language
about the role of sodomy law in American culture, 29 and in queer
life - a massive shift from the rhetoric of Bowers and a subtle but
crucial change from the majority and minority opinions in the
Texas Lawrence case. And yet, the different conclusions that Ken-
nedy and Scalia come to, and the authorities they invoke to reach
them, demonstrate an ideological chasm between them. This di-
vide separates not just Kennedy's famed libertarianism 30 and
Scalia's retrogressive conservatism, 31 but two understandings of
what it means to be gay in the world. Both Justices acknowledge the
existence of gay people and even gay identity, but only Kennedy
recognizes that identity to be fundamentally human, embodied, vul-
nerable to attack, and worthy of respect.
This Essay, then, is a follow up and companion to the earlier
work, examining rhetorical strategy in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas in the context of my previous analysis of
the case in the Texas courts. I reflect and expand upon some of the
ideas in the earlier article, briefly discuss the use of legal authority
28. And unlike the opinions in state court, the tone of the federal opinions makes
it abundantly clear that the justices acknowledge the mire of cultural debate they are
wading into.
29. One reason for this, of course, is that the suggestion thatJustices Kennedy and
Scalia can easily align with the political "left" and "right" in the first place. While there
is little doubt that Justice Scalia is more politically conservative than the average U.S.
citizen, it is not conversely true thatJustice Kennedy is more liberal. Moreover, Justice
Kennedy's opinion is careful, where possible, to rely upon the work of scholars known
for their conservative leanings. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Richard A.
Posner & Charles Fried). Justice Scalia's dissent is equally strategic, where possible us-
ing the work of noted gay legal scholar William Eskridge to support his recounting of
this history of sodomy prosecutions. Id. at 2494.
30. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution, NATIONAL REVIEW,
July 10, 2003.
31. Whole books have discussed this issue. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATrIVE REVIVAL Uohns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997).
[Vol. 48
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in the Supreme Court's opinions, and meditate upon some of the
rhetorical and political shifts that occurred between the final deci-
sion of the Texas Court of Appeals and that of the United States
Supreme Court. Finally, I consider where the Court has yet to ven-
ture - I discuss the importance of the Court's recognition of the
significance of gay identities, but suggest that its insight will be far
more realistic and valuable when it is complicated by an under-
standing of the systemic discrimination and bigotry that those iden-
tities engender.
II. READING LAWRENCE
A. The Battle Over Gay Identity32
Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any
other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic
means.
33
Few commentators doubt that the contest over sodomy laws
had effects reaching far beyond the handful of criminal prosecu-
tions the statutes engender. Part of the greater import of the issue
are the far-reaching effects that statutes criminalizing behavior at
the core of an entire set of social identities may have by virtue of
their very existence, even if rarely enforced.3 4 But even beyond that
realm, the last several decades of consensual sodomy litigation has
done something broader - it has acted as a signpost for an enor-
mous shift in the ways that law and society imagine gay people and
gay lives.
It is a clich6 in analyzing Bowers to note that the majority opin-
ion and the dissent are speaking two very different languages when
32. For a more detailed discussion of the issues surrounding the development of
judicial language about gay and lesbian identities in Bowers v. Hardwick, see Kris
Franklin & Sarah E. Chinn, I Am Wat I Am (Or Am I?): The Making and Unmaking of
Lesbian and Gay Identity in High Tech Gays, 15.1 DiscouRSE, 11 (1992).
33. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced"
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000) (exploring the disadvantages such
codes may create).
2004]
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it comes to sexual identity.35 This distinction can be boiled down to
what has long been defined as the status/conduct divide. 36
Whereas the dissent takes into account the existence of some quan-
tifiable group of people organized around something called a gay
identity,3 7 the majority is steadfast in its insistence that it is dealing
only with a set of behaviors: "homosexual sodomy." While "homo-
sexual sodomy" might be engaged in by the people the Court calls
"homosexuals," the majority opinion gives no indication that such a
group of people have anything in common except the tendency to
engage together in acts against nature. Justice Burger's concur-
rence goes further, associating homosexual sodomy not with people
but with the "ancient roots" of opprobrium towards it.38
By the time the Court decided Romer v. Evans,39 the terms in
which it considered lesbians and gay men was beginning to shift.
Since the case itself hinged on Colorado's Amendment 2, a referen-
dum that forbade the state or municipalities within it from passing
legislation protecting gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from dis-
crimination, 40 and was about identifiable groups of people rather
35. See generally, Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A
Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1805 (1993).
36. See, e.g., E. Lauren Arnault, Status, Conduct, and Forced Disclosure: What Does Bow-
ers v. Hardwick Really Say?, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 757, 771-772 (2003); Cheshire Cal-
houn, Sexuality Injustice, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 241, 250-53 (1995);
Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1717 (1993).
37. For example,Justice Blackmun characterizes the Court's decision that Michael
Hardwick had standing to appeal to them, whereas a heterosexual married couple,
equally affected legally by Georgia's anti-sodomy statute did not, as "rest[ing] in signifi-
cant part on Georgia's apparent willingness to enforce against homosexuals a law it
seems not to have any desire to enforce against heterosexuals." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). More telling is his recognition that "individuals define
themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others."
Id. at 205.
38. Id. at 196 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
39. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
40. The amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orienta-
tion. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordi-
nance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, con-
duct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority sta-
[Vol. 48
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than sexual activities, 41 to a certain extent the language of gay iden-
tity was a prerequisite to any comprehensible discussion of the is-
sues involved. Denying the social existence of lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people would render Amendment 2 unintelligible: that is
to say, the Amendment would arguably be discriminating against a
group that did not exist as such.42 Even Justice Scalia's dissent in
Romer, which argued that Bowers, by criminalizing homosexual sod-
omy, made discriminating against homosexuals perfectly accept-
able, acknowledged that there might be a collection of people
whose sexual practices conferred upon them a social identity. As
he argued, "there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal." 43
These were the struggles over the meaning of same-sex inti-
macy and queer identity that I was trying to tease out in analyzing
the two disparate versions of the state of Texas' determinations in
Lawrence. In so doing, I coined the term "Ellen effect" to capture
the complex changes in public discourse - "a watershed in the way
the straight mainstream media conceived of lesbians and gay men
as simultaneously culturally meaningful and not intimidating. '44
Here "cultural meaning" signifies more than just visibility; rather it
is the assumption that gay identity inheres in actual people who share
a certain identity that makes it impossible for the mainstream to
talk about homosexual behavior without generating an image of gay
people. As a result, the status/conduct divide becomes farcical.
Moreover, the Ellen effect assumes that gay people are not simply
part of the social fabric, but can be integrated into society and its
tus, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
CoLo. CONST., Art. II, § 30b.
41. The statute applied to identifiable groups at least insofar as it covered those
with "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation." Id. As the Romer majority itself
reflected, the effect of Amendment 2 was to "put [homosexuals] in a solitary class with
respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental sphere."
Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
42. Of course, from the perspective of the drafters, this is much more common-
sensical than it sounds. The notion that there should be no "special rights" based on
homosexual conduct or identity was exactly the basis for Amendment 2 in the first place:
it is impossible to conceive of legal protection for a group whose existence you dispute.
43. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641.
44. Franklin, supra note 12, at 60.
2004]
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institutions. 45 Thus it recognizes the combination of cultural signif-
icance and normalization of gay identity that has characterized the
last decade or so of public discourse around homosexuality. This is
a marked change from at least some earlier conceptions of the so-
cial significance of gayness. After all, Justices Burger (in Bowers) 4 6
and Scalia (in Romer and Lawrence)4 7 implicitly argue for the cul-
tural importance of sodomy and laws forbidding it, but their opin-
ions nearly link same-sex activity and/or gay identities with the
collapse of a functioning society - the furthest one can imagine
from an unintimidating social class.
As I have argued, in the time since Bowers, the courts have gen-
erally become "Ellenized. ' '48 Thus the majority and dissent in both
the first Texas Court of Appeals decision (Lawrence I), and the sub-
stituted Texas en banc decision (Lawrence II) take for granted the
existence of gay people and even gay communities. The Ellen ef-
45. Of course this integration has been lubricated by lesbian and gay figures who
are fairly non-threatening to non-gay people: beautifully "chic" lesbians, the gay charac-
ters on WILL & GRACE or the helpful "Fab Five" from Queer Eye for the Straight Guy. See,
Melissa Fletcher Stoeltje, A Gay Time in America, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 24,
2003, at IA. That is, gay people may be easier to take when they seem safe and do not
threaten heterosexual primacy, or when their life's purpose seems to be making the
lives of straight people more pleasant and stylish. But this kind of media representation
of gay people has not been embraced universally within queer communities. Indeed,
some scholars and activists explicitly object to the defanged gayness that has found its
way into the mainstream on the grounds that queer identity is (or at least should be) a
counter to the values of heteronormativity. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE
WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999); MICHAEL BRONSKI,
THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE: SEX, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY FREEDOM (2d ed.
2000).
46. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring) (noting that sodomy
prohibitions' "ancient roots" are "firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards."). It should be noted that the Court's majority neatly sidesteps the issue, but
its vague observation that sodomy laws easily meet the standard of rational moral
choices by the majority, suggests that it is not unsympathetic with that position, either.
Id. at 196.
47. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-43 (Scalia,J. dissenting); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490-
91.
48. An obvious example of this shift is found in Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Lawrence. Despite having joined the majority's insistence that Bowers dealt
solely with sexual conduct that happened to take place between persons of the same
gender, Justice O'Connor now asserts that "[t]hose harmed by this [same-sex sodomy
prohibition] are people who have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus, are more
likely to engage in the behavior prohibited ... " Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 48
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fect changes the rhetoric around sodomy laws, and makes it much
harder for the Lawrence II majority to do what the Hardwick majority
did with ease: ignore the potential civil rights issues that sodomy
laws may entail. The combination of the Ellen effect and the vigor-
ous dissent makes it more politically complicated for the court to
appear to align itself with bigotry.49 Hence we find in Lawrence, the
tragicomic vision of Justice Scalia asserting that he has nothing
against homosexuals as long as we know our place: despite himself,
he has to admit that we might have a place in contemporary United
States culture and there is nothing he can do about it.
But once the roots for the effect have taken hold, the questions
raised by a consensual sodomy law shift. Consequently, the author-
ity upon which the questions may be resolved must move as well, or
risk being seen as outdated and irrelevant.
B. Core Authorities in Lawrence
... the most pertinent beginning point is our decision in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut. 50
It is clear from even a cursory examination of the three major
opinions51 in Lawrence, that each justice approaches the case with
very different narratives of authority. This makes perfect sense,
since each opinion is telling quite a different story not only about
sodomy law, but also about the nature of constitutional jurispru-
dence. Much can, and doubtless should, be made of the important
distinctions between, for example, older conceptions of rational ba-
49. Franklin, supra note 12, at 86.
50. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
51. I am not addressing Justice Thomas's dissent as a "major opinion." Not only is
this dissent unusually brief (two paragraphs) but it does not significantly add to the
debate. Thomas simply states that Texas's sodomy law is "uncommonly silly" and
should be repealed , and concludes first that this is an issue for the states rather than
the Supreme Court, and second that the Constitution does not provide for the right to
privacy at all. Id. at 2498. It is striking that the only authority he cites is Justice Stewart's
dissent to Griswold (from which he directly quotes), the majority opinion of which
serves as a cornerstone for Justice Kennedy's opinion.
Clearly Thomas is modeling himself on Stewart as an old-style strict-constructionist
conservative, which is itself, an interesting move. But while Thomas aligns himself with
Justice Scalia by joining in his dissent, he distances himself from Scalia's enraged rheto-
ric, taking up the mantle of Stewart's genteel conservatism rather than identifying with
Scalia's more contemporary reactionary language of the "culture wars."
2004]
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sis review and Justice O'Connor's newer construction of the con-
cept. 52 But for the purpose of this brief Essay, it is sufficient simply
to note how radically the foundational precedent in each opinion
differs.
For Justice Kennedy, the road to overturning Bowers begins
with Griswold v. Connecticut, and continues with the development of
the doctrine of the constitutional right to privacy that runs through
Eisenstadt v. Baird53 and culminates in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey.54 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor tells a
very different story, which focuses on Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.55 and the reconsideration of the meaning of "rational
basis" in the absence of suspect classification status for lesbians and
gay men. Finally, and not surprisingly, Justice Scalia leans most
heavily on Bowers v. Hardwick itself, arguing, "most of today's opin-
ion has no relevance to its actual holding.
5 6
Quite obviously, these differences in foundational precedent
reflect (and construct) the varying legal analyses that the justices
bring to their opinions. 57 For the majority, the central issue is the
preservation and furthering of human dignity that the Court has
already identified and protected in its line of privacy decisions. So
even though, oddly enough, the Court does not hinge its opinion
directly on the right to privacy, it makes sense that the underpin-
nings of the privacy decisions, which is to say the initial movement
from Griswold to Eisenstadt,58 as well as the most recent decisions
52. For a thorough analysis of the Court's emerging "new scrutiny," see Louis D.
Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002) (contending that the Rehnquist
Court was often seeking "measured reasonableness" in state action, rather than merely
formalist declarations of "rationality").
53. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
54. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
55. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
56. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. My analysis here necessarily compresses and probably oversimplifies the signif-
icance of each opinion's reasoning and use of authority. No doubt other scholars will
weigh in heavily on what is at stake in each of these opinions, given how rich they are.
But since this essay is simply an attempt to read Lawrence v. Texas through the lens of my
previous analysis of the Texas court's reasoning, such an inquiry is well beyond the
scope of this work.
58. The expansion of privacy protections for birth control measures from the mar-
ital context in Griswold to unmarried couples in Eisenstadt is perhaps even more impor-
tant in a gay rights context than the initial construction of Fourteenth Amendment due
process-based privacy rights in the first place. Had the right to privacy been narrowly
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encapsulating the current state of privacy doctrine, that is, Casey,
would also undergird the Court's analysis. 59
Justice O'Connor's opinion is equally clearly signaled by her
foundational reliance on Cleburne. She finds herself unable to
agree with the majority's overturning of Bowers based on broad no-
tions of personal liberty,60 but does not want her judgment that
anti-gay sodomy laws do not infringe upon a fundamental right to
lead to a standard of rational basis review that would allow the gov-
ernment unfettered ability to constrain personal behavior.61 Con-
sequently, she takes the middle ground and relies on the Cleburne
decision, which offers a third way between what she sees as the
Scylla and Charybdis of right to privacy on the one hand and pre-
sumptive rational basis on the other. Cleburne constitutes the roots
of a different genealogy that Justice O'Connor plainly intends to
reshape the meanings of rational basis and challenge the free hand
the Court has given legislatures in defending the reasoning behind
their laws. 62 By positioning the concurrence in this way, then Jus-
tice O'Connor can correct what many see as the error of Bowers
without having to deem it wrongly decided, and can furthermore
move toward the heightened rational-basis jurisprudence that many
scholars believe she is urging.
Justice Scalia's choice of authority is hardly unexpected. His
entire argument centers on the notion that Bowers is recent, bind-
construed as restricted to the "intimate relation of husband and wife," it could much
more easily be interpreted to have nothing to say about gay sex (unless gay marriage
were to become a legal reality). For a discussion of the ways in which Eisenstadt's con-
ception of the zone of privacy for families is "much more radical than Criswold's," see
Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relation-
ship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345, 357-60 (1997).
59. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481. Thus Casey's reaffirmation that individual auton-
omy over "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime...
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" is particularly cru-
cial to the Court's reasoning. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (cited in Lawrence).
60. Particularly since she signed onto the original Bowers decision. Bowers, 478
U.S. 186.
61. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485.
62. Id. Scholars have observed a general turn in this direction by the entire court,
and have generally describe Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, politically to the center of
the current Court, taking a central role in that movement. See generally, Dan T. Coenen,
The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1281, 1391-92 (discussing the Court's handling of "semisubstantive" ques-
tions, and analyzing the approaches of Justice O'Connor and Kennedy).
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ing authority, and consequently (pre-)determines the outcome of
this case.63 Given this position, Scalia does not feel obliged to de-
fend the logic of Bowers itself - he does not have to if it is the out-
standing precedent. His opinion, therefore, centers solely to
attempting to demolish the reasoning of the majority.
This identification of central legal authority is helpful, but
fairly transparent. But my initial work with the Lawrence case was an
effort to go beyond an analysis of legal authority for its pure prece-
dential value and to inquire more broadly how authority operates
and what the judicial use of legal authority reveals.
To do that, I began to construct a system of classification of
authorities that initially divided into several categories, the most im-
portant of which were "looming" and "lurking" authorities. 64 In my
analysis, looming authorities are more than just precedent; rather,
they are those authorities, controlling or not, which "appear im-
mense and inescapable" within the context of a legal decision. 65
While looming authorities might be binding in a strictly legal way,
they are organized more around sensation of the central issues
rather than mechanistic use of precedent; as I argued, "binding or
not, they might shape the theoretical orientation of the court's
analysis, and thus must be addressed to maintain consensus about a
decision's legitimacy. ' 66 In the Texas Lawrence decisions, Bowers v.
Hardwick plays this role - not only as precedent, it looms over the
question of sodomy law more generally, in part constructing what it
means to be lesbian or gay in the eyes of the court and in the
United States more generally. The case looms not only over the
Texas court but over every state court addressing the issue of sod-
omy, even when those state courts are, as Texas is here, focusing
only on their state constitutions. Beyond its status as binding prece-
dent, Bowers is "a symbol of the contested landscape of American
sexual life." 67
Lurking authority is, as its name suggests, a little more amor-
phous. Lurking authorities may or may not be precedential; what is
63. Id. at 2488-89.
64. Franklin, supra note 12, at 92-100. The discussioi- here compresses the argu-
ments made in the earlier article.
65. Franklin, supra note 12, at 93.
66. Franklin, supra note 12, at 93.
67. Franklin, supra note 12, at 94.
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significant about them is their very lack of "loomingness," which
makes the judicial decision to invoke them all the more compelling
and revealing of how they operate. While looming authorities,
whether binding or not, hang heavy over a decision, lurking author-
ities are discovered on the sidelines and deployed as deliberate in-
terpretive strategies. Thus non-legal authorities are always lurking,
be they the doll studies in Brown v. Board of Education68 or the his-
torical research of John D'Emilio, Estelle Freedman, and Jonathan
Ned Katz in Lawrence, but legal authorities can lurk just as well. To
that extent, then, lurking authorities are crucial clues to the inter-
pretive work a court is doing - invoking certain authorities brings
with them a specific ideological and legal orientation. 69 An exami-
nation of those legal authorities provides a new framework for un-
derstanding the work of the court itself.
C. Repositioning Bowers
I begin with the Court's surprising readiness to reconsider a deci-
sion rendered a mere 17 years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick.70
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence was surprising not
simply because of its outcome, although that was remarkable
enough. It was conceivable, after all, that the Court could overturn
the Texas sodomy statute and still leave Bowers v. Hardwick intact.71
That was what numerous state courts had done 72 including, in its
68. 347 U.S. 483, 494, n.l (1954).
69. A good example of this is the use of Biblical sources in sodomy law cases. See,
e.g., Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 503 (Lambert.,J., dissenting); see also, Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196
(Burger., C.J., concurring) (referring more vaguely to "Judeo-Christian moral and ethi-
cal standards"). It would be rare indeed to find opinion simultaneously quoting the
Bible and opposing sodomy laws.
70. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. This is certainly what most commentators expected the Court to do, and had
Justice O'Connor's reasoning been adopted this would have been the result. Given the
Court's equal protection reasoning in Romer, as well as the court's general reluctance to
reverse themselves, this position seemed like a reasonably secure one before the deci-
sion was issued. See VincentJ. Samar, The Supremes Gay Rights, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 11,
2003, at 17 (recounting the "surprise of legal commentators and many in the lesbian
and gay community" at the expansive basis for the majority opinion).
72. Jegleyv. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell, 510 S.E.2d 18; Gyyczan, 283
P.2d 112; Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. 1996); Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487.
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initial decision, the Texas Court of Appeals.73 Bowers seemed so
looming that it was hard to imagine how the Supreme Court could
overturn it at all, notjust because it was such recent precedent but,
more importantly, because its influence was so far-reaching in
United States culture over the fifteen years after it was issued. 74
This perception was borne out by both the majority and dissent in
the en banc Texas Lawrence decision and by the United States Su-
preme Court's avoidance of Bowers in its prior decision in Romer v.
Evans. In these three opinions, Bowers looms heavily.
The looming character of Bowers is particularly interesting in
the Texas decision on Lawrence, because theoretically, the court was
solely interpreting the Texas constitution and its Equal Rights
Amendment, rather than considering the precedential nature of
federal law. Hence there was no reason for the court to discuss
Bowers at all. The fact that so many states overturned their sodomy
statutes even after Bowers was decided in 1986 75makes it clear that
state appeals courts were drawing lines between local and federal
law, and relegating Bowers to the realm of the federal. 76 To that
73. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d 349.
74. Justice Scalia himself notes this in footnote 2 of his dissent, citing reliance on
Bowers for determining that no "fundamental right" was implicated in a broad range of
issues, including sexual conduct by military personnel, adoption of grandchildren,
naming of children at birth, and employment practices of the defense industry and
police and firefighting organizations. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490, n. 2. As one
scholar puts it, Hardwick could serve as valuable authority against legal protections for
gay people on a variety of fronts under the theory that "If a State can criminalize sod-
omy, .. . why cannot it keep lesbians and gays out of the military; deny gay and lesbian
parents custody, or visitation, etc.?" Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and the Limits of Legiti-
macy: Stripping Opponents of Gay and Lesbian Rights of their "First Line of Defense" in the Same-
Sex Marriage Fight, 24J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 232 (1998).
On the other hand, it can be argued that Bowers had a profoundly favorable effect
on gay organizing (or no effect at all) given the enormous strides of queer movements
even after the case was handed down. The backlash against the decision, and its
roundly criticized reasoning, were perhaps a galvanizing force in lesbian and gay politi-
cal work throughout the late 1980s, 1990s, and even beyond.
75. ByJune, 1986, twelve states had done so through judicial or legislative means.
For a complete state-by-state breakdown of extant sodomy laws pre-Lawrence, see http:/
/www.ngltf.org/downloads/sodomymap06O3.pdf. (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
76. And perhaps, implicitly criticizing the Supreme Court's reasoning. Though,
as Justice Scalia notes, there were also certainly a large number of cases using Bowers as
precedent. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490. In an interesting maneuver (and an indirect
swipe at the similar move by the Casey majority), Justice Scalia constructs this very fact,
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extent then, Bowers was moot for Texas, particularly given the re-
cent example of Georgia's overturning of its sodomy statute.
But, legally relevant or not, Bowers could not be banished. As I
have argued, in any case concerning lesbian and gay issues, whether
specific to sexual conduct or not, Bowers casts a heavy shadow. 77 In
the days after the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision and the
emerging national debate on legalized marriage between gay part-
ners, it is hard to remember quite how stifling an influence Bowers
had on the legal imagination regarding possible protection of les-
bian and gay people. But at the time the case was decided, the
debate between the majority opinion and dissent in the Texas Law-
rence case about Bowers was not rooted in its precedential value but
in its cultural weight. Because it was not binding upon interpreta-
tions of state law, the case could be thrust aside by courts choosing
to go in different directions, but because it loomed so heavily, its
method could easily be adopted by courts inclined to concur with
its outcome. In its dissent to the Texas Court of Appeals' reinstate-
ment of its sodomy law, the minority seems to be looking over its
shoulder at Bowers, defensively shooing it away by symbolically wav-
ing the Texas state constitution at it.
Strikingly, the other case that looms over the Texas Lawrence
decision itself had to wrestle with the specter of Bowers: Romer v.
Evans. As I argued in my initial analysis of the Texas court's Law-
rence decision, once one acknowledges, as Romer does, that lesbian
and gay people are a group whose civil rights must be protected,
specifically anti-gay sodomy laws take on a very different political
color. 78 At the time that the Texas court was struggling with this
issue, both Bowers and Romer were good law. The irony of Romer,
however, is its studied avoidance of Bowers, which it manages not to
mention at all. 79 Romer's commitment to the "status" side of the
that Bowers has regularly been used as precedent, authoritative. That is, he suggests that
the fact forms a basis for concluding that the ruling should not be overturned. Id.
77. As I have argued, "[t]he use of the phrase 'as the Supreme Court held in
Bowers v. Hardwick,' in a sodomy case immediately signals to the reader that the opinion
will support not only the constitutionality of sodomy statutes but an entire worldview
about the relevance (or, rather, irrelevance) of sexual orientation." Franklin, supra
note 12, at 81.
78. Franklin, supra note 12, at 94-5.
79. In fact, Romer's avoidance of Bowers gives the Texas Lawrence majority its most
powerful ammunition in disposing of Romer as a binding precedent. Arguing that
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conduct/status divide does not erase the fact that Bowers looms over
its decision; rather the strategy of the majority in Romer is to pre-
tend that the looming discourse over anti-sodomy statutes has no
bearing on the civil standing of lesbians and gay men.80
However, the Romer opinion could not directly oppose
homophobia (as, for example, Loving explicitly opposed white
supremacy8 l). Doing so would have forced the Romer court to con-
front Bowers head on, something it was unwilling to do, and since
the case was not directly on point, it was something that it could
evade. For state courts, where Bowers has less precedential weight,
Romer can then take on immense meaning because it offers a coun-
terpoint. Using Romer in a sodomy law context becomes a way to
argue against sodomy laws because of the effect they have on gay
people as a group, without directly taking on the legitimacy of Bow-
ers. Romer differs in flavor from Bowers because, and since it was one
of the earliest times that the Supreme Court used the language and
the concept of gay people, its invocation conjures up the spirit of
lesbian and gay identity. Ironically, because of the Ellen effect, in
and after Romer, the invocation of Bowers becomes not simply a sign
of homosexual-sodomy-as-conduct, but a mark of opprobrium to-
wards gay people, as linked to, but not only defined by sexual
conduct. 82
Given the legal and cultural changes that produced and were
brought about by Romer, one might expect to see the decision figur-
ing heavily inJustice Kennedy's Lawrence opinion. But it is Romer's
position as a compromise between Bowers and a pro-gay stance that
superannuates it in Lawrence.83 Simply put, Romer does not loom
for Lawrence, because the decision has the air of having bigger fish
to fry, namely Bowers. After almost two decades of primacy in the
Romer did not address the issue of "homosexual conduct" and hence was irrelevant to a
consideration of anti-sodomy statutes, the Texas court attempted (and succeeded) to
duck away from the looming status of the case. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 355.
80. As many commentators, including Justice Scalia in his dissent, have pointed
out.
81. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
82. And characterized by the phrase later adopted by Justice Scalia, "the homosex-
ual agenda," which clearly implicates broader questions of social policy.
83. Consequently, the Court raises Romer only to suggest that an equal protection
argument based on it might be "tenable," but is not the subject of the Court's decision.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
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realm of law relating to homosexuality, Bowers is unseated, replaced
by a different narrative with a very different set of values: privacy,
dignity, and self-determination.
D. The Narrative of Gay Identity
Today's opinion is the product of a Court . .. that has largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda.
8 4
But if Bowers no longer looms, what is left? The answer to that
question depends upon whether the respondent is Justice Kennedy,
Justice O'Connor, or Justice Scalia.
Let's return to Kennedy's opening gambit in his demolition of
Bowers. According to the logic of the majority opinion, the inevita-
ble starting place to "reconsider the Court's holding in Bowers" is
the thirty-year progression of privacy rights that stretches from Gris-
wold to Casey. By moving directly from Bowers to Griswold, Kennedy
is effectively repudiating the Bowers majority's disarticulation of gay
identity and the right to privacy, the cornerstone of that decision.
Moreover, Kennedy imagines the story of privacy law as a narrative
of endlessly increasing liberty (something that the Court's decisions
in its recent past might very well put into doubt) ,85 concluding,
"[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can in-
voke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."
86
What hovers over the case for Kennedy, and lurks as authority,
then, is not any one case, but a larger concept: progress. The his-
torical focus of Bowers, particularly injustice Burger's concurrence,
becomes for Kennedy, its greatest weakness. Kennedy's belief that
"our laws and traditions in the past half century are of the most
relevance here" is deeply revealing, as is his reliance on contempo-
84. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. For some examples of recent Supreme Court cases limiting potential privacy
rights, see United States v. Am. Library Assoc., 539 U.S. 194, 123 S. Ct. 2297
(2003) (finding that libraries' use of internet filtering devices pursuant to federal statute
were not violating individuals' right to private speech); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Ac-
tion, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that mandatory drug testing did not impermissibly
violate high school athletes' privacy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (upholding Missouri statute placing limitations on access to abortion).
86. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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rary (and, one might add, queer) historians rather than Blackstone
and Montesquieu.
For Kennedy, progress in a gay rights context means acknowl-
edging the contemporary cultural compact that gay people exist as
a class and as such must benefit from the expansion of civil free-
doms over time. Hence, it is not surprising that his opinion is suf-
fused with the fallout of the Ellen effect, a quintessentially
contemporary phenomenon. Kennedy's opinion takes for granted
that John Lawrence and Tyron Garner were not simply bodies par-
ticipating in various illegal acts, but gay men engaging in a "per-
sonal relationship."8 7 The Ellen effect's twin outcomes of cultural
significance and acceptability of homosexuality are nowhere so
clear as in Kennedy's direct refutation of the equation of gay iden-
tity with sexual acts: "to say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse."
This is not the place to speculate about the analogy that Ken-
nedy draws here (particularly given his veiled references to gay mar-
riage and his mild assurances that this ruling does not open the
door to the possibility),88 but his language does indicate a larger
link. On the one hand, Lawrence is all about sex, just as Griswold was
about the right to have non-procreative sex within marriage. But
the argument of Griswold (and later Eisenstadt) linked the concept
that marriage was about more than sex to the idea that sex was
about more than reproduction. Moreover, since Griswold, marriage
has been increasingly off-limits to the law; it has been constructed
as a relationship so private and so sacred, that despite its myriad
interpolations with the public world of contracts, taxes, property
rights and so on, that the law has, or ideally should have, little regu-
latory power.8 9 In regards to marriage, then, Griswold arguably ren-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2484.
89. That is, since the Griswold decision, the Court has consistently reaffirmed the
sanctity of (heterosexual) marriage, and the inappropriateness of state control over this
form of consensual intimacy. Marriage stands as a protected, intimate relationship,
which should not be interfered with. See E. Clifton Knowles, Consensual Sexual Activity
Between Married Persons, 44 TENN L. REv., 179, 187 (1976) (contending that the Supreme
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dered itself redundant: a law that seeks, where possible, to define
marriage as outside the realm of law. It is exactly that move that
Kennedy is shadowing in Lawrence. Once Bowers is out of the way,
there is no looming authority: sexual relationships between con-
senting adults might be viewed as beyond the reach of the law, sub-
ject only to the rights and responsibilities we share as human
beings.
As soon as the yoke of Bowers has been thrown off, the entire
Court is free to develop its analysis of Lawrence based on any author-
ity that seems to lurk in the field. It is striking, in this context, that
Justice Kennedy chooses to revisit the history of sexuality first laid
out in the Bowers decision. Justice Kennedy offers an extensive, al-
most point-by-point refutation of the Bowers court's conclusion that
"[p]roscriptions against [same-sex sexual acts] have ancient
roots,"90 citing as authoritative: scholars of gay and lesbian history
who have suggested that historically, homosexual conduct was not
uniquely sanctioned in sodomy restrictions,91 England's Wolfenden
Report,92 which concluded that homosexual acts should be
decriminalized in Great Britain, and the very recent construction of
sodomy as a same-sex, or "homosexual" offense. 93 Justice Kennedy
thus attacks the historical assumptions underlying Bowers, and then
moves on to build his own history - telling a story of relatively re-
cent criminalization of gay conduct, coupled with an even more re-
cent trend toward liberalization of the law due to a growing
consensus that gay people deserved respect and basic protection
under the law. 94
Court generally shies away from regulating the "protected intimate relationship" of
marriage).
90. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
91. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479. Credit for bringing these authorities to bear on
the issue does not rest with the court, of course, since these sources were relied on in
petitioner's brief, and in the briefs of numerous amici. But regardless of who makes the
introduction into judicial discourse, when such scholarship is cited as authoritative by
the courts themselves, it gains a unique value that other sources, no matter how indis-
putable, may not possess.
92. Id. at 2481.
93. Id. at 2479.
94. See id. at 2481 (observing the movement of European human rights law toward
invalidation of sodomy prohibitions, and suggesting that U.S. states have been following
a similar trajectory).
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And since the slate of binding authority has been wiped clean,
Justice O'Connor is similarly able to move in a very different direc-
tion. Her response is to act as though overturning Bowers is no big
deal (she dedicates two sentences to it), that her focus is elsewhere,
on the issue of Equal Protection as laid out in Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center.95 But this reasoning, too, only has meaning in an El-
len-affected world. The Bowers majority would find the idea that
there could be equal protection for sodomites unintelligible, and
essentially deems that argument "facetious."96
Although O'Connor joined the Bowers majority, she has clearly
changed with the times, opposing the Texas sodomy statute be-
cause it is "targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed
towards gay persons as a class."'9 7
O'Connor's concurrence makes clear that the fight that was
going on in some of the earlier sodomy cases and gay rights cases
generally is over. In 2003, the Ellen effect is so powerful that one
must acknowledge the social reality of gay identity or look like a
bigot. Of course, this puts Justice Scalia in a very difficult situation,
in light of his attachment to the methodology of Bowers.98 He can
no longer depend upon the world view that he had imagined in-
controvertible. The fait accompli represented by these narratives of
95. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In fact, in my earlier piece analyzing the Texas court's
writing in this case, I noted with interest the fact that Cleburn was used by the majority,
but "just as a side point." Franklin, supra note 12, at 87; Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 380.
Since unlike Justice O'Connor the Texas Court of Appeals had neither the authority
nor the inclination to expand upon the case's analysis of rational basis review, this
makes perfect sense.
96. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. To be fair, the Court's specific reference here was
actually to the due process argument raised in the case. For the reasons discussed here
and elsewhere, the Court did not see an equal protection issue in the case at all.
97. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In a poetic irony,
O'Connor quotes Scalia's dissent in Romer to prove her point, reversing the intention of
his argument that "there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class
than making the conduct that defines the class criminal." Id. Where Scalia used this
point to argue that sodomy laws made the majority opinion in Romer untenable,
O'Connor deploys it to demonstrate the innate unfairness of gay-only anti-sodomy
statutes.
98. In fact, Scalia's dissent in Lawrence does not seek to offer its own reasoning for
upholding the constitutionality of the Texas statute. Rather it relies solely on stare deci-
sis, appealing to the power of Bowers as a (now non-existent) precedent, and warning
that the majority's decision represents a "massive disruption of the current social or-
der." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Griswold to Casey to Romer on the one hand, and Cleburne to Law-
rence on the other, leaves behind the story that Justice Scalia wants
to tell: a story in which sexual conduct is classifiable and our hu-
manity and our sexual desires are wholly divorced from each
other.99 Scalia has no recourse to Bowers, but it is his only recourse.
Set adrift in this inhuman universe, he grips onto Bowers like Ish-
mael clinging onto Queequeg's coffin, an empty box whose desig-
nated occupant has sunk out of sight elsewhere and long ago.
Perhaps this explainsJustice Scalia's intemperate tone. His dis-
sent is peppered with phrases italicized for emphasis 00 and charac-
terized by acerbic potshots at the majority.101 As is often true,
Scalia is in fact right: the Court, and the culture that surrounds it,
has signed onto the "homosexual agenda" as he describes it, a cam-
paign to reduce the often murderous contempt and hatred towards
queers and same-sex eroticism that characterized much of the twen-
tieth century. 10 2 But so has Justice Scalia. As soon as he begins to
talk about "homosexuals" as an identifiable subsection of the citi-
99. Hence Scalia's conflation of a whole host of sexual behaviors including "adul-
tery, fornication, and adult incest, and laws refusing to recognize homosexual mar-
riage." Id.
100. For but one example, see Scalia's italicization in his discussion of Casey, in
order to emphasize his contention that a Court treating stare decisis loosely could result
in criticism of precedential opinions being used as a reason to "overrule" them in one
instance, but "affirm" them in another, and to point out that the majority's suggestion
that Casey's reasoning undercuts Bowers' cannot stand in light of the fact that Roe "which
was already on the books when Bowers was decided," offers "less" protection for abortion
rights than did Roe. Id. at 2488-89.
101. There are numerous examples of unusually inflamed rhetoric in Justice
Scalia's opinion. To recite just a few, see his assertion that "the Court does not have the
boldness to reverse" the conclusion he sees as central to Bowers'holding, his contention
that the majority's conclusion that the Texas sodomy law is not rational "is so out of
accord with our jurisprudence - indeed, with the jurisprudence of any society we know
- that it requires little discussion" (italics again), or his use of simple but strikingly
descriptive characterizations of the majority's "grim warnings" about the consequences
of criminalizing gay sexual expression or its "coo[ing]" over the importance of gay rela-
tionships. Id. at 2492, 2495, 2496-98.
102. In fact the historian's amicus brief submitted to the Lawrence court posits that
"discrimination on the basis of homosexual status was an unprecedented development
of the twentieth century," and traces increasing restrictions on gay life from the Great
Depression through World War II and the McCarthy era, and sees a lessening, but not
eradication, of anti-gay bias beginning in the 1970s. Brief of Professors of History at
George Chauncey, et. al, at 10-29, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003) available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/183.
pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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zenry, 1° 3 the logic of the Bowers opinion, such as it was, dissolves.
Scalia has been Ellen-ized, and Bowers cannot stand in the face of
that substantive a change.
III. THE LOOMING (AND LURKING) RACE ANALOGY
[The framers] knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. 104
Another narrative looms over the Lawrence decision, one that is
barely referred to by any of the opinions but that silently informs
both Justice Kennedy's writing for the majority and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence: the trajectory of racial civil rights deci-
sions from Plessy v. Ferguson'0 5 to Korematsu v. United States'0 6 to
Brown v. Board of Education.10 7 While the parallels between Lawrence
and Brown were much commented upon in the media,' 08 the Court
only tangentially references this analogy. Structurally, the analogy
holds fairly well:' 09 both Brown and Lawrence make claims beyond
the importance of precedent, and perhaps implicitly what some
identify as the doctrine of "higher law" - the set of principles that
issue from the larger ethical issues presented by the Constitution
103. E.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497.
104. Id. at 2484 (emphasis added).
105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
106. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108. See, e.g., Frank Rich, And Now, the Queer Eye for Straight Marriage, N.Y. TiMES,
Aug. 10, 2003, at Sec. 2, p. 1 (quoting legal scholar David J. Garrow as deeming Law-
rence "as significant as the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision"); Rick Perlstein,
What Gay Studies Taught the Court, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B03 (noting that
"[s]ome court watchers have called Lawrence the most momentous civil rights decision
since Brown outlawed school segregation in 1954").
109. I want to acknowledge that the comparison between these two marginalized
groups can be valuable, but that there are also pitfalls to the suggestion that the first set
of circumstances maps neatly onto the second. The analogy between race and sexuality
often feels compelling to queer litigators and legal scholars, particular since arguments
from race have had, in the post-Civil Rights era, a certain public moral legitimacy that
arguments from sexuality have not often had. However, the analogy can only be strate-
gic, if that (and the strategy doesn't necessarily work anyway), since the cultural under-
standings and lived experiences of race and sexuality, although relatable, are certainly
not identical.
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rather than a conservative accordance with majoritarianism.1 10
Moreover, the eventual embarrassment that Korematsu engendered
- upholding the internment of Japanese nationals and Japanese
Americans during WWII - proved to the judiciary1 ' is implicitly
echoed in Kennedy's determined rejection of Bowers.
At the same time there are significant differences between the
Plessy-Brown trajectory and the journey from Bowers to Lawrence.
Among other considerations, as Justice Scalia points out, the time
between sodomy law decisions was, by the Court's standards, re-
markably short. While it took almost sixty years for the Court to
reconsider Plessy, Bowers was overturned after only seventeen
years. 112 However, methodologically the two are comparable. Just
as Lawrence does not counter Bowers with another opposing legal
authority, the Court in Brown argues against Plessy primarily with
110. GREGG D. CRANE, RACE, CITIZENSHIP, AND LAW IN AMERICAN LITERATURE,
(2002). In fact, Crane's book, which discusses representations of the legal struggles
over slavery, abolition, segregation, and black civil rights in the nineteenth century,
maps astoundingly well onto the issues raised by Lawrence. Crane associates a commit-
ment to higher law with a belief in the expansion of human and civil rights, a political
cosmopolitanism and international consciousness, and a faith that while the framers of
the Constitution could not predict the directions the nation would take, they could
support the liberalization of the American polity: all hallmarks of Justice Kennedy's
Lawrence decision. Kennedy's cosmopolitanism and internationalism are particularly
striking here. Just as antislavery activists pointed to Europe, and specifically to Great
Britain, to prove that slavery was anathema to post-Enlightenment Western values, Ken-
nedy observes that throughout Europe "[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consis-
tent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct. The right the petitioners seek in this case has been ac-
cepted as an integral part of human freedom in many countries." See Lawrence, 123 S.
Ct. at 2483.
111. The work of Eugene V. Rostow and Peter Irons in exposing the falsehoods on
which Korematsu was based, in terms of inaccurate intelligence about Japanese-Ameri-
can involvement in espionage and the virulent anti-Japanese racism of West Coast com-
mander John DeWitt, have been crucial in reshaping legal understandings of the
meanings and ramifications of Korematsu. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese-American
Cases- a Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Peter Irons, Fancy Dancing in the Marble Pal-
ace, 3 CONSTIT. COMMENT. 35 (1986); see also, THE MASS INTERNMENT OFJAPANESE AMERI-
CANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS (Charles McClain, ed. 1994).
112. Though, as Justice Kennedy points out, stare decisis "is not an inexorable com-
mand." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Helvering v.Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
(1940); cited in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 1991).
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the evidence of the doll studies and other social scientific research
to show that separate can never be equal. 113
While the majority in Lawrence gestures towards alternative his-
torical and legal interpretations of the meaning of sodomy laws, ul-
timately, as Brown does with the practice of educational
segregation, the decision is arguing from a moral and ethical posi-
tion that sodomy laws are in theory and in practice undemocratic,
and that by unfairly targeting one segment of the population they
threaten the liberty 1 4 of all citizens. 115 Lawrence's deployment of
pro-gay historians and legal scholars is analogous to the Brown
court's reliance upon anti-racist sociologists such as Gunnar Myrdal
and his magisterial study of American racism, An American Dilemma,
as well as the famous doll studies undertaken by Kenneth B.
113. But of course, this oversimplifies the reasoning of Brown, and elides the
Court's examination of, among other points, the growing centrality of formal education
in American culture in the time between Plessy and Brown. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537; Brown,
347 U.S. at 492-94.
114. For example, Justice Kennedy's opening salvo: "Liberty protects the person
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places....
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expres-
sion, and certain intimate conduct." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. Here Kennedy is not
talking only about queer people, but about values that he believes apply to all Ameri-
cans equally - in some ways, he is implicitly citing Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous
declaration that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. MARTIN LUTHER
K.NG, JR., & JESSE JACKSON, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1967).
115. This is in large part due to the work of gay and lesbian historian activists such
as those cited in the decision: John D'Emilio, Estelle Freedman, Jonathan Ned Katz,
whose contribution to the history and historiography of sexuality was long considered
marginal both in form and content. But the history here is deployed specifically to
contest the historical constructions in Bowers. This alternative narrative renders the
history of sodomy laws and their meaning debatable rather than incontrovertible, and
therefore frees the Court to pursue other kinds of reasoning, such as its arguments for
dignity and expanding freedom. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79.
The Court's maneuver here is comparable in some ways to the strategy of the
Brown Court, and the comparison is compelling. In order to neutralize the Plessy
Court's definitive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as having nothing to
say about racial segregation, Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548, Chief Justice Warren recounts the
history of interpretations of the Amendment, Brown, 347 U.S. at 490-91. He determines
that there are so many conflicting readings that the Court must turn to other bases for
its logic. Id. In so doing, the Court releases itself from the straitjacket of the prior
Court's interpretation and thus creates space for its reasoning to hinge on social sci-
ence data, leading it to a "new" understanding of the Equal Protection clause in the
context of racial segregation in schools. Id. at 495.
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Clark."16 Brown's use of social science, like Lawrence's invocation of
recent national and international history, is provided as much to
reassure an anxious audience about the massive social changes tak-
ing place as it is to support its position.' 17
But Brown looms most significantly in the Lawrence majority's
adoption of a righteous moral tone. Justice Warren's declaration
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate education facilities are inherently un-
equal" ' 8 finds its parallel in Justice Kennedy's statement that Law-
rence and Garner "are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime."'119
The majority's focus not just on the constitutional right to pri-
vacy but the human right to a dignified life borrows directly from
the rhetoric of Brown. Kennedy's avowal that Lawrence "involves lib-
erty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimen-
sions"'120 in many ways echoes Justice Warren's declaration in Brown
that education is "the very foundation of good citizenship.. .a prin-
cipal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values... and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment."'12 1 Similarly,
the argument that "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
116. See Richard Goldstein, The Matthew Shepard Icon: Sometimes the Image of a Martyr
Fits the Victim of a Crime, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 13-19, 2002; James Brooke, After Beating of
Gay Man, Town Looks at Its Attitudes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998.
117. This raises another commonality between the rhetoric of the two cases. In
Brown, the Court, even after hearing reargument regarding the intent of the 14th
Amendment, concludes that the issue is murky, and essentially declares the debate a
draw, rendering it unhelpful in its ultimate determination of the segregation question.
Brown, 349 U.S. at 489-90. The Lawrence majority appears to deploy its examination of
the history of sodomy prohibition for a similarly neutralizing effect, to render inert the
history relied upon by the Bowers majority, and the Burger concurrence.
118. Brown, 349 U.S. at 495.
119. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. One crucial difference between the two decisions
is the willingness of each to explicitly critique the precedent they were overturning.
While Kennedy is unsparing in his dismissal of Bowers, the Brown court spends very little
time discussing Plessy while overturning it. It is likely, of course, that Brown's
closedmouthedness about Pessy was a result of the Court's desire for a unanimous deci-
sion in the case, given the intense political importance of the issue of desegregation.
But since it was clear from the beginning that the Lawrence court could never come to a
unanimous decision, each side might have felt freer to attack the opposing position
(the exception being Justice O'Connor, who takes a much more centrist stance).
120. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
121. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individuals put forward," maps almost directly onto Warren's obser-
vation that segregation is more than a mechanical separation of
black children and that it "generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'122 The Supreme
Court's decision in both cases to reverse itself is more than a re-
consideration of the legal issues: it is a deliberate policy change and
an acknowledgment of prior mistakes. In many ways, Brown and
Lawrence are variations on the old American genre of the conver-
sion narrative, in which transformation cannot be explained except
through the embrace of a new vision. 123
If Plessy and Brown loom for the majority in Lawrence, then Kore-
matsu lurks in the background, subtly but decisively affecting the
decision's rhetoric and approach. Korematsu's status in the history
of civil rights cases is ambiguous to say the least: while it was the first
place in which the Supreme Court outlined a set of standards by
which differential treatment according to race must be considered,
its conclusion - that Japanese and Japanese Americans pose such a
threat to American national security that the government can at
least temporarily strip them of their liberty - was monumentally
wrongheaded. In addition, while Korematsu's legacy of the doctrine
of heightened scrutiny has been immensely useful for the further-
ing of civil rights of people of color, the case itself has increasingly
been viewed as a low point in American jurisprudence, on a level
with Dred Scott and Plessy.
Korematsu's relevance to Lawrence extends beyond the injustice
of its determination. For if Bowers is gay peoples' Plessy, and Law-
rence is our Brown, then the Texas court's decision in Lawrence can
be viewed as our Korematsu. In Korematsu the Court declared that
"[plressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
122. Id. at 494.
123. As scholars of early American culture such as Perry Miller and Patricia Cald-
well have argued, the conversion narrative was fundamental to the development of a
cultural sense of self in New England. The narrative served two seemingly opposed
purposes: to fit within a recognizable script of experience by which the larger commu-
nity could judge the legitimacy of a conversion experience, and to give voice to the
unvoiceable, the presence of God. PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM COL-
ONY TO PROVINCE (1953); PATRICIA CALDWELL, THE PURITAN CONVERSION NARRATIVE:
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN EXPRESSION (1983).
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such restrictions [as internment]; racial antagonism never can" and
then went on to argue that internment was a public necessity. 124
Thus, while raising the bar considerably on the limits of white
supremacy, a standard that opened the possibility for the Brown de-
cision, the Korematsu court chooses to ignore the fact that anti-Japa-
nese sentiment and legislation had a long and ignoble history on
the West Coast, and that the imposition of martial law and subse-
quent curfew and internment there were simply the latest in a series
of discriminatory acts.125
The Texas Lawrence court makes strikingly similar moves in its
decision to uphold its sodomy law in its invocation of Loving v. Vir-
ginia. As I have argued, 126 the use of Loving as an authority in sod-
omy law cases most often indicates sympathy towards greater sexual
freedom, and an (either implicit or explicit) analogy between race
and sexuality as marginalized identities. Like the majority in Kore-
matsu, however, the Texas court deploys Loving to show the incom-
mensurability of race and sexuality. The court frames its discussion
of Loving in the context of the African American struggle for civil
rights; in fact it represents Loving as the culmination of heroic bat-
tles against the evil power of white supremacy. 127 But it subverts the
customary use of Loving by asserting that "while the purpose of Vir-
ginia's miscegenation statute was to segregate the races and perpet-
uate the notion that blacks are inferior to whites, no such sinister
motive can be ascribed to the criminalization of homosexual con-
duct."1 28 This is almost identical to the rhetorical move made by
the Korematsu majority: a condemnation of one kind of prejudice
followed by an assertion that a different kind of discrimination is
124. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
125. For example, the Alien Land Act of 1913, which prevented aliens not eligible
for U.S. citizenship from owning land, which effectively excluded all Asian-born immi-
grants, given the 1790 act of Congress that limited naturalization to white people (a
restriction the Supreme Court affirmed in 1922 in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1922)). The passage of the Japanese Exclusion Act in 1924 severely limited immigra-
tion until the 1960s. FRANK F. CHUMAN THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE
AMERICANS (1976). Moreover, the internment order had been immediately preceded
by a curfew on all Japanese Americans, which was challenged and upheld in Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
126. Franklin, supra note 12, at 82-86.
127. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 351-52, 357.
128. Id. at 357.
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wholly rational. 129 Clearly, for the Korematsu majority, hatred for
Japanese Americans is not the same as "racial antagonism" but is
instead a healthy respect for national security; similarly, while ra-
cism is "sinister," homophobia is something quite different (harm-
less? salutary?).
The understanding that Korematsu and its resonance in the
Texas Lawrence decision lurk beneath Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence, helps explain why the decision combines a kind of histori-
cal relativism with moral absolutism. At a time of political and so-
cial crisis, the Korematsu court may have felt that their decision was
"necessary and proper" but we now recognize that the ruling
"serve[d] only to oppress.' 30 While Brown could not completely
erase the blot on the nation's escutcheon that Korematsu represents,
it could instead act as a corrective, a movement towards a greater
moral standard of liberty and democracy. Similarly, although Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence cannot convince the Texas
court that homophobia is as "sinister" as racism, it can argue for a
different way of looking at the power of the dominant culture in
subordinating the rights of the marginalized.
Finally, but not insignificantly, the example of Korematsu casts a
shadow of shame over American jurisprudence that clearly sharp-
ensJustice Kennedy's antipathy towards Bowers. Bowers is not simply
bad law - it is an embarrassment. 131 Its antediluvian arguments are
based in animus, just as Korematsu's efforts to portray Americans of
Japanese descent as disloyal threats to the war effort were, at bot-
tom, racist. While Korematsu might still be, almost sixty years later,
too much of a hot potato to invoke directly, it clearly lurks behind
129. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-19.
130. For a succinct discussion of the consensus that Korematsu was both wrongly
based on racial animus and simultaneously valuable in establishing a grounding for
important subsequent civil rights determinations, see Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The
Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court Moves from Approving Internment ofJapanese
Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for African Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L.
165, 166-74 (2003).
131. Hence Justice Kennedy's several references to what a disaster Bowers has been
jurisprudentially. For example, he characterizes the Bowers Court's description of what
was at stake in the case as an indication of "the Court's own failure to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake," Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478, and bemoans the fact that
"[iln our own constitutional system the deficiencies in Bowers became even more appar-
ent in the years following its announcement." Id. at 2481.
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Justice Kennedy's spirited opposition to the bigotry represented by
anti-gay sodomy laws and the pretense that there is no "sinister mo-
tive" there, only the needs of the state to protect itself.
IV. HOMOPHOBIA AND THE "MATTHEW SHEPARD EFFECT"
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in
the private spheres. 132
The greatest insight, one might argue, of the stream of consti-
tutional civil rights victories beginning with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion was not that segregation was in and of itself discriminatory, but
that the system of racial segregation was built upon a foundation of
white supremacy, and the separation of blacks and whites was always
and only ever on terms set by the white majority. Segregation was
destructive because it was created by white racism as a mechanism
of subordination, control, and humiliation - something the doll
studies and Myrdal's travels through the American South proved
beyond a doubt.133 The argument that segregation was destructive
towards black self-esteem and self-determination, and that the sup-
pression of African Americans was a national scandal, was what sep-
arated Brown from its predecessors. After all, previous cases had
allowed African Americans to attend and participate fully in the life
of all-white educational institutions, including the University of
Texas Law School13 4 and graduate school in Oklahoma, t35 but
none had questioned the very basis of separate but equal and its
historic links to the Taney Court's infamous observation in Dred
Scott that the Constitution's framers might have considered black
132. Id. at 2482.
133. For an historical account of the process by which Myrdal's work and Kenneth
B. Clark's studies shaped the Brown plaintiffs' litigation strategy, see RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE, 313-45 (1975).
134. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ordering the University of Texas to
admit an African-American applicant to its law school where no law school in the state
admitted black students).
135. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (striking
Oklahoma statute permitting black doctoral students but provide separated classrooms,
library usage and cafeteria facilities).
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people to have "no rights that the white man was bound to
respect." 136
Just as Brown, for the first time in American jurisprudential his-
tory, acknowledged the corrosive effect racism and white supremacy
have had on Americans of African descent, and the blight that ra-
cism has brought to the nation as a whole, Lawrence is the first place
in which homophobia is revealed as a destructive social force that
dehumanizes not just queer people but the culture that supports it.
While Romer v. Evans (whose majority opinion was also written by
Justice Kennedy) affirms that the protections lesbians and gay men
seek under non-discrimination statutes are simply "protections
taken for granted by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them,"13 7 the decision fails to speculate on
why the entire state of Colorado might want to deprive gay people
of those protections.
Not surprisingly, the Romer minority is less puzzled. Justice
Scalia (again, not coincidentally), the author of the dissent, recog-
nizes Romer for what it is: a result of Kulturkampf' 38 (or, as he calls
it in Lawrence, the "culture war" 139). For the Romer dissent, Colo-
rado's Amendment 2 is wholly reasonable, since it chooses to dis-
criminate against a group of people whose sexuality is repugnant to
both the people and the laws. 140 While this might seem ironic, that
those opposing gay freedom are the only ones who are able (or at
least feel free) to identify homophobia, the seeming naivet6 of the
Romer majority points to one of the weaknesses of the Ellen effect.
The Ellen effect makes queer people visible and non-threaten-
ing; it does not, however, explain why people hate us and want to
do violence to us, nor does it even acknowledge that they do so. In
fact, by representing lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals as unin-
timidating, it implicitly denies the power that homophobia has, par-
ticularly over the most vulnerable members of our communities as
well as the most powerful among us. 1 4 ' Hence the Romer majority
136. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
137. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631
138. Id. at 636.
139. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497.
140. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 647.
141. For example, even after Ellen DeGeneres came out, there was not a lot of
discussion about what had kept her closeted for so long. The pattern is frequently
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opinion is typical of the cultural changes that surrounded the Ellen
effect as a phenomenon: willing to identify homosexuals but blind
to the pervasive power of homophobia.
Only a few years later, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy seems to be
writing out of a very different consciousness. Homophobia (al-
though never named as such) has become a central concern to the
Lawrence decision's logic, and eradicating homophobia is linked to
the larger constitutional project of the nation's "search for greater
freedom." 142
How can we account for this massive change in less than a dec-
ade, a shift from the basic libertarianism that Kennedy's jurispru-
dence has been known for to an impassioned argument for liberty
as a transcendent virtue? After all, it is not as though homophobia
suddenly appeared on the scene for the Supreme Court to identify.
In fact, quite the opposite has occurred. As many scholars and ac-
tivists have noted, homophobia has been an integral part of moder-
nity itself, an era characterized, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has
argued, by "the homo/hetero division."1 43 More importantly, the
moment at which the Supreme Court chose to acknowledge that
the cultural opprobrium towards homosexuality was one in which
hatred of, and violence towards, queer people has finally begun to
wane.
144
What happened between 1995 and 2003 that might have
caused this shift in the Court's discursive approach to
homosexuality?
Of course, one can only speculate. However, within the larger
social and historical context of attitudes towards gay people, per-
haps the most significant consciousness-raising event was the brutal
repeated with the (still comparatively short) list of now openly gay celebrities - indeed,
their closetedness is sometimes interpreted as an individual weakness of their psycho-
logical make-up rather than a symptom of the pervasive homophobia of American
society.
142. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
143. EvE KoSOFSKV SEDGEWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990).
144. ALAN S. YANG, THE 2000 NATIONAL ELECTIONS STUDY AND GAY AND LESBIAN
RIGHTS: SUPPORT FOR EQUALITY GRows NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE FOUNDA-
TION, 2000 available at http://www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfm#2 (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
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murder (one might even say lynching 145) of Matthew Shepard in
October, 1998. A 21-year-old student at the University of Wyoming,
Shepard was abducted from a Laramie bar, tied to a fence, robbed,
beaten, and left for dead on the remote plains. 146 The intense pub-
licity and public outrage over Shepard's murder was a watershed
event for both gay and straight people, pushing homophobia and
the violence it engenders onto the front pages of newspapers
around the country. 147 For many gay people, it felt like the first
time that the mainstream recognized the levels of fear and anxiety
that accompany much of queer life around the country, and the
often tragic results of the homophobic rhetoric of religious and po-
litical leaders.1 48 To many Americans, the language of "special
145. The term "lynching" has deep and bloody roots in U.S. culture, and using it to
apply to the murder of Matthew Shepard evokes the similarities (brutality, a murder
fueled by hatred) and the crucial differences. For example, most pseudo-penological
lynchings were public events, attended by a cross-section of a community's white, and
sometimes black, population, occasionally even advertised in advance and/or memori-
alized after the fact in photographs and postcards. Rarely were perpetrators of lynch-
ings brought to justice: indeed, in many instances members of law enforcement and the
legal profession were active and passive participants in lynchings. On lynching, see
generally UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage,
ed. 1997); RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHING (2d ed., 1972). For disturbing
photographs of actual lynchings, see WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN
AMERICA (James Allen, ed., 2000.).
While it can be argued that Matthew Shepard's murder was, like typical lynchings,
a "message" crime intended to terrorize lesbian and gay people more generally, it was
not committed in the public eye, but rather took place in an isolated, desolate location.
Moreover, whatever mixed feelings the people of Laramie, WY and the United States
more generally might have had about homosexuality and gay people, the public re-
sponse to the murder was almost universally one of condemnation rather than the stud-
ied neutrality or even approval that was voiced by the American mainstream regarding
anti-black lynching. For responses to the murder of Matthew Shepard, see The Laramie
Project Archives, available at www.nytimes.com/ads/marketing/laramie (last visited Feb.
11, 204)
146. James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead: 2 Are Charged, N.Y TIMES, Oct.
12, 1998, at A9;James Brooke, Gay Man Dies from Attacks, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A30.
147. Lexis/Nexis records 403 "major stories" discussing the attack on Matthew
Shepard in "major newspapers" between October 9, 1998 and October 31, 1998, includ-
ing repeated A section stories in USA Today, the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Chicago Tribune, the Rocky Mountain News, the Denver Post, the Seattle Times,
and the Miami Herald-Tribune.
148. See Sid Smith, Matt Shepard Bios Use His Death to Skewer Hate Crime, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Mar. 8, 2002, at IC ("Clearly his homicide endures as an emblem of the hor-
rors of homophobia, just as lynching embodied similar hatred in another era.").
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rights" that the supporters of Colorado's Amendment 2 used in
their arguments in Romer began to ring more hollow in the wake of
Shepard's death. We might, then, dub this emerging consensus
over the pervasive and pernicious effects of homophobia in the lives
of queer people the "Matthew Shepard effect" - if a well-educated,
clean-cut, All-American gay man like Shepard could be the victim of
such a violent crime, what might that mean for the rest of us?
While the Ellen effect seems now to have suffused contempo-
rary understandings of gay identity, whether supportive of gay
rights or opposed to them, the Matthew Shepard effect has become
the contemporary locus of controversy. As we have seen in the
Texas Lawrence decision, the Texas Court of Appeals explicitly de-
nied the influence of homophobia on anti-gay sodomy laws. It had
to, because Bowers, its primary looming authority, essentially consti-
tutes an official United States policy of homophobia. Just as Brown
had to make visible the racism that undergirds segregation before it
could overturn it, the Texas Lawrence decision must obscure the
homophobia that infuses Bowers in order to put it to rest. Acknowl-
edging the animosity behind contemporary anti-gay sodomy laws
would force the Texas court to recognize queer people as citizens
with civil rights that were potentially being abrogated, rather than a
group of people who participated in acts that were socially
abhorred.
Justice Kennedy's language of human dignity, and his focus on
the narrative of privacy rights are, at the very least, an indirect result
of the Matthew Shepard effect: the recognition that lesbians and
gay men are not simply a group, but a vulnerable population whose
rights must be protected if we are to live in a just society. While
Justice Scalia openly asserts the existence of the culture warsJustice
Kennedy seems to understand that in those wars both queer people
and our freedoms of self-expression, association, and self-determi-
nation have been significant casualties. Kennedy does not just re-
verse the Texas Lawrence court's decision, he reverses its
representation of laws against lesbians and gay men as ethically neu-
tral. Once the concept of homophobia is introduced, those laws
cannot be seen in the same light.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in ho-
mosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scout masters
for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as
boarders in their home. 1 49
The Supreme Court's Lawrence decision has enormous ramifi-
cations, not least of which is the overturning of all sodomy laws na-
tionwide. 15 0 More importantly, perhaps, it has acted as a watershed
in public discourse around gay people and issues of sexual orienta-
tion. From almost the moment of the decision's being made pub-
lic, voices from the left and right were weighing in on the meaning,
implications, and possible results of the decision. In a post-Lawrence
world, the significance of sexual orientation and the terms in which
it can be publicly discussed seem to have shifted permanently.
When Bowers was decided, no one was sure precisely what it
would be used for (although we could speculate) but it was clear
that this kind of official sanctioning of anti-gay policy had to have
broader applications and would be used as precedent for more is-
sues than simply sodomy. The same has to be true in the inverse
here. Some of the most obvious possible changes are those already
raised by the Court's decision.1 5 1 But we cannot imagine to what
other legal uses this decision could be put as precedent, 152 or how
willing this Court (or other incarnations of the Supreme Court in
149. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. At the very least, it overturns everything that sodomy laws have been used for,
for example the deployment of the existence of sodomy laws as justification for denying
queer people other civil rights or protection from discrimination. But also, the opinion
garnered widespread speculation about its potential ramifications for gay marriage. See,
e.g., Shutting the Bedroom Door a Victory for Privacy Nevertheless Brings up the Issue of Gay
Marriage, Prrrs. POsT-GAZETrE, July 1, 2003, at a-15; George Edmonson, Lawsuit Chal-
lenges Military's Gay Policy, ATLANTA JoU-AL-CoNsT., July 20, 2003, at 5A.
151. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's musings on the case's ramifications for same-sex mar-
riage. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497-98.
152. Though early indications show courts unwilling to read it expansively, see, for
example, State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (holding Lawrence does not
preclude state law punishing sexual acts between adults and children of the same gen-
der far more severely than adults and children of opposite genders); Lofton v. Sec'y of
the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (1lth Cir. 2004) (finding Law-
rence inapplicable to Florida ban on adoptions by homosexuals).
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future years) would be to use it as an authority more generally.153
What we do know is that when as revered a body as the United
States Supreme Court comprehends not just the rhetoric but the
texture of queer lives, it becomes harder and harder to articulate a
reasoned anti-gay argument. This is not to say that there will not be
opposition to gay rights positions, in fact backlash to this decision
has already begun. 154 It simply means that the grounding upon
which anti-gay rhetoric was based is shifting, leaving less room for
anything but explicit ideology.155
However, the future is not necessarily as rosy as this analysis
might lead one to conclude. The analogy to Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation is instructive here. Shortly after the Supreme Court decided
Brown it had to issue another decision instructing school systems on
implementation of desegregation. 5 6 Moreover, the power of the
law was not enough to integrate African American children into
many schools: the National Guard was needed for that.157 By the
1960s desegregation was hardly less controversial or violently op-
posed. The lynching of Emmett Till only a year after the Brown
153. Courts do have a way of ignoring or, more precisely, defining out of relevance,
Supreme Court decisions on gay issues that interfere with their own local agendas. For
example, after Bowers was decided, thirteen courts overturned their own sodomy stat-
utes by making a distinction between federal and state constitutions. Similarly the U.S.
Supreme Court managed to ignore Bowers in its own decision in Romer v. Evans.
154. For a discussion of the politics of backlash in relation to Lawrence, see Jeffrey
Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at 48.
155. Of course, what can strike a reader as ideological may seem to the speaker to
be common sense. For example, George W. Bush's assurance that "I am mindful that
we're all sinners" and that "it's very important for our society to respect each individual,
to welcome those with good hearts, to be a welcoming country" probably seemed to him
an evenhanded way in which to address the recent Lawrence decision and questions
about the future likelihood of gay marriage, rather than an explicitly religious and ideo-
logical statement that invoked the anti-gay rhetoric of the Christian right. Andy
Humm, Bush Says "Codify" Man-Woman Marriage, GAY CITv NEWS, Aug. 1-13, 2003, at 1.
156. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Of course, further implementa-
tion decisions litter the 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358, U.S. 1 (1958)
(unanimously holding that the state of Arkansas could not declare itself unbound by
the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation rulings); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964) (finding unconstitutional the closing of public schools to avoid desegrega-
tion); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (ordering de-
segregation of schools in Charlotte, North Carolina); Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189
(1973) (ordering desegregation across school districts in Denver, Colorado).
157. For a thorough discussion of the Little Rock school integration struggle, see
EvEs ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 1954-1965 (Juan Williams, ed., 1998).
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decision, riots by white Mississippians at the attempts by black stu-
dents to enroll at the University of Mississippi, 158 the brutal and
sometimes murderous attacks on black and white civil rights lead-
ers,159 and the vocal opposition to integration by Southern leaders
such as George Wallace and Strom Thurmond160 demonstrate that
social change is hardly a peaceful process, even with the law on the
side of that change. And of course, despite the enormous successes
of the anti-segregation movement, much of American society re-
mains separated by race.16 1
In fact, despite the acknowledgment of a history of institution-
alized United States racism in Brown, the public discourse ever since
has still tried to distance itself from that reality. From the Bakket 62
decision in the mid-1970s to the Court's current decision in Michi-
gan affirmative action cases Gratz163 and Grutter,16 4 civil rights re-
dress for the pernicious and ongoing effects of systemic racism
(and even whether that racism still exists) remains a site of
controversy. 165
A similar pattern with respect to homophobia and issues of sex-
ual orientation is predictable. Already, only a few years after the
murder of Matthew Shepard, anti-gay violence has receded far from
the headlines. The fatal stabbing of Sakia Gunn, a teenage lesbian
in Newark, NJ, in early 2003, while obviously a homophobic attack,
received only local mainstream coverage and was national news in
158. PAUL HENDRICKSON, SONS OF Mississippi: A STORY OF RACE AND ITS LEGACY
(2003).
159. For example the murders of Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew
Goodman in 1964, the assassination of Medgar Evers in 1963, and the violence against
nonviolent protestors throughout the South. For a more detailed discussion of violence
against both white and black civil rights workers, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEAjs,1963-65 (Simon & Schuster eds., 1999).
160. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF
THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1996); KARI
FREDRICKSON, THE DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH, 1932-1968
(2001).
161. For but one discussion of contemporary racial segregation, see Anders Gyl-
lenhaal, Segregation Returns to State Schools, THE NEWS OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2001 at A21.
162. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
163. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
164. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
165. Indeed the most effective defense for affirmative action now seems to be that a
diverse educational environment is good for white students, erasing the positive value
higher education might have for students of color.
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only the lesbian and gay press. 166 While racism and class bias
clearly plays a role in the minimal attention Gunn, a black working
class girl, received, the role of homophobia in local and national
governments and media is much greater.' 67
The path for gay rights advocates and attorneys, then, seems
clear. The more consensus there is regarding the power of
homophobia to limit and even destroy our lives, the more success-
ful advocacy on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender cli-
ents or rights can be. When the courts address homophobia head-
on, they are more likely to understand the world from a queer per-
spective, and not coincidentally, rule in favor of queer litigants.168
One goal, then, should be to capture and expand upon not only
the influence of Lawrence as an astonishingly favorable precedent,
but also on the assumptions underlying it. In order not to lose the
value of the Ellen and Matthew Shepard effects the courts and the
general public must focus on more than just the existence of gay
people; they must be reminded of the historical violence both ac-
tual and metaphorical that has been perpetrated against us. It is
only with both of these phenomena in mind that advocates might
truly get the courts to see the experiences of lesbians, gay men,
bisexuals and transgender people as their most looming authority
regarding queer lives.
166. A search through national gay media reveals multiple stories regarding
Gunn's murder. See, e.g., N.J. Teen Killed After Revealing Her Sexuality, THE ADVOCATE,
Wed., May 14, 2003; Newark Man Sought in Lesbian Murder, THE ADVOCATE, May 15, 2003.
However, a Lexis search conducted on October 8, 2003, for references to "Sakia &
Gunn" in "major newspapers," found no sources.
167. For an excellent analysis of the silence around Gunn's murder, see Kelly Cogs-
well & Ana Simo Erasing Sakia: Who's to Blame?, THE GULLY, (Aug. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.gully.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
168. A much more complete discussion of the role of homophobia in the courts is
developed in, Beth Barrett, Defining Queer: Lesbian and Gay Visibility in the Courtroom, 12
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 143, 149-60 (2001).
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